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Matter: Missions in the Defense of Spanish Florida, 1566-1710

MISSIONS IN THE DEFENSE OF
SPANISH FLORIDA, 1566-1710
by R OBERT A LLEN MATTER *

America generally credit its Indian
S mission systems asLatin
effective instruments of frontier defense.
TUDENTS OF COLONIAL

1

A study of the Spanish missions of Florida does not support this
thesis. The “paper” bulwark provided by the Florida missions
when challenged could represent a significant exception to the alleged importance of the defense role of the church in the Indies.
Or, it could reveal that the missionaries played an ineffective part
in the defense of Latin-American frontiers. Regardless, Florida’s
story suggests the need for a critical re-examination of the
premise that religious missions held strategic areas beyond the
line of established settlements.
For about a century after the consolidation of Menéndez de
Avilés’s 1565 conquest a serious external threat to the strategic
colony appeared remote, and Spain seemed satisfied to concentrate
on evangelizing Florida’s aborigines. Presumably, the Christian
missions would secure the settlement with a minimum of Spanish
military and economic assistance. Nevertheless, chronic difficulties
— royal neglect, resulting in inadequate economic and military
support; an unwillingness or inability to establish a sound local
economy; Indian troubles; and dissension between Florida’s governors and missionaries— plagued the colony throughout its first
Spanish era. The debilitating church-state feud fed the other
problems, hindering the development of a sound colony.
*

Mr. Matter, a Seattle resident, is a graduate of the United States Military
Academy and holds graduate degrees in history from Seattle University
and the University of Washington. He is currently teaching United
States history for Chapman College, Orange, California, in the Navy’s
Program for Afloat College Education (PACE).

1. Herbert E. Bolton, Wider Horizons of American History (New York,
1939; facsimile edition, South Bend, Indiana, 1967), 80-84, 109-10, 115-19,
123-28, 130-31, 147; Verne E. Chatelain, The Defenses of Spanish Florida,
1565 to 1763 (Washington, 1941), 24-25, 35, 58, 60, 118n, 119-20n, 148;
John Jay TePaske, The Governorship of Spanish Florida, 1700-1763
(Durham, 1964), 6; Kathryn Abbey Hanna, Florida, Land of Change, 2nd
ed. (Chapel Hill, 1948), 56, 60.
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Three general types of discord between the governors and the
fathers marked the church-state bickering: a struggle for jurisdiction over the mission Indians; disputes concerning proper treatment of the aborigines; and conflicts in determining priorities
between military security and the religious effort. Of these controversies, the latter most adversely influenced colonial Florida’s
military weakness and thus its vulnerability.
The dispute over military security began early in Florida’s
history. During a brief, unsuccessful Jesuit period, 1566-1572,
despite Menéndez’ support of their program, Father Superior
Juan Bautista de Segura opposed the governor’s policy of stationing troops in or near the Indian missions. Segura claimed the unchristian example set by the soldiers and their drain on Indian
food supplies made the padres’ challenging task of converting
the natives more difficult.2 Thus began an argument that continued intermittently throughout most of the mission period:
were military detachments on the frontiers, supposedly hindering
the evangelical program, essential for the security of the colony?
The fate of the Jesuit missions illustrates the ineffectiveness
of the defense role of the church in Florida. Inadequate military
garrisons in the south enabled Indian rebellions to force the
abandonment of missions at Tequesta, near present-day Miami,
and San Antonio on Charlotte Harbor. After further conversion
attempts in the northern coastal provinces of Guale and Orista
failed, the Jesuits decided to carry the faith to Ajacán on the Bay
of Santa María (Chesapeake), where the Indians had not been
spoiled by Spanish troops. Scorning military protection, the
isolated mission collapsed in martyrdom in 1571, within months
after its arrival. The tragedy ended Jesuit evangelical activity in
Spanish Florida.3
2. Woodbury Lowery, The Spanish Settlements Within the Present Limits
of the United States, Florida 1562-1574, II (New York, 1905; facsimile
edition, New York, 1959), 346-47; Clifford M. Lewis and Albert J. Loomie,
comps. and eds., The Spanish Jesuit Mission in Virginia, 1570-1572
(Chapel Hill, 1953), 26, 74, 221. See also Robert Allen Matter, “The
Spanish Missions of Florida: The Friars Versus the Governors in the
‘Golden Age,’ 1606-1690” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington,
1972), 171-72, 201-02, 308-11; “Economic Basis of the Seventeenth-Century
Florida Missions,“ Florida Historical Quarterly, LII (July 1973), 18-38.
3. Zelia Sweett and Mary Sheppy, The Spanish Missions of Florida (St.
Augustine, 1940), 16-18; Lowery, Spanish Settlements, II, 340-48; Felix
Zubillaga, La Florida, La Misión Jesuitica (1566-1572) y La Colonización
Española (Roma, 1941), 279, 371, 422-23; Bartolomé Barrientos, Pedro
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In 1573 a small band of Franciscan friars arrived in Florida.
They also objected to military garrisons near mission towns, protesting that soldiers hampered evangelism. Nevertheless, despite
the support of the converted chief of Guale and the interest of
other local natives in Christianity, three Indian uprisings between 1576 and 1583 forced three Spanish evacuations of their
northernmost outpost at Santa Elena (Port Royal Sound). By
1588 the overtaxed Spaniards had permanently abandoned the
post.4
The faltering missionary program began in earnest in the
autumn of 1595 with the arrival of significant Franciscan reinforcements. In a rare climate of friendly relations between the
fathers and soldiers, Florida yielded an estimated 1,500 Christian
Indians by the end of the year.5 Seemingly, the zealous friars had
“reduced the Gualeans to a state of docility, or acquiescence. . . .
Where the soldier once dared not venture out in search of provisions, the Indian now submitted to regulatory action of the
padres, and all raised their voices with the friar in the Ave María,
the Pater Noster, and the Credo.“6
The “bubble” burst in September 1597 with the martyrdom
of five Franciscans by Christian and pagan natives resentful of
the missionaries’ban against polygamy. It required two ruthless
punitive military expeditions to subdue the rebels and restore
order. Not until the end of 1601 were the Gualeans again at
peace with their Spanish masters. The rebellion reportedly set
back mission development twelve to fifteen years.7

4.

5.
6.
7.

Menéndez de Avilés, Founder of Florida, trans. Anthony Kerrigan
(Gainesville, 1965), 120, 126-32; Father Juan Rogel to Menéndez de
Avilés, December 9, 1570, in Eugenio Ruidíaz y Caravia, La Florida, Su
Conquista y Colonización par Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1893), II, 301-08; Lewis and Loomie, Spanish Jesuit Mission, vii,
15-24, 27-28, 38-40, 45-48, 89-93, 107-10, 118-20, 181-82, 220-24; Michael
V. Gannon, The Cross in the Sand: The Early Catholic Church in Florida, 1513-1870 (Gainesville, 1965), 33-36.
Maynard Geiger, The Franciscan Conquest of Florida (1513-1618) (Washington, 1937), 36-38; John R. Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians and Their Neighbors (Washington, 1922), 58-59; Gregory Joseph
Keegan y Leandro Tormo Sanz, Experiencia Misionera en La Florida
(Siglos XVI y XVII) (Madrid, 1957), 259-65; John Tate Lanning, T h e
Spanish Missions of Georgia (Chapel Hill, 1935), 59-64, 74.
Lanning, Spanish Missions of Georgia, 73; Geiger, Franciscan Conquest
of Florida, 58-68; Gannon, Cross in the Sand, 36-39; Keegan y Tormo
Sanz, Experiencia Misionera, 273-78.
Lanning, Spanish Missions of Georgia, 72.
Luís Gerónimo de Oré, “The Martyrs of Florida (1513-1616),” trans. and

Published by STARS, 1975

3

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 54 [1975], No. 1, Art. 4
MISSIONS

IN THE

DEFENSE

OF

SPANISH FLORIDA

21

Ignoring less-civilized southern tribes, the recuperated Franciscans steadily moved inland, reaching the Suwannee River in
the province of Timucua by 1616. Unable to provide military
protection, the governors for a time restrained the eager friars
from pushing further westward, where one-half or more of the
populous, sedentary Apalachee tribe reputedly desired to become Christians.8 Finally, in 1633 Governor Luis de Horruytiner
blessed the expansion of the mission system into the long-coveted
province of Apalachee. He believed converted Indians on his
western frontier not only would be welcome additions to the
ranks of Christendom, but also would serve to strengthen the
colony’s defenses.9
As in Guale a half-century earlier, the Apalachee appeared to
accept docilely Spanish-Christian restraints and abuses, but the
Apalachee also turned on their rulers and shepherds. In a sudden
attack in 1647 a band of Apalachee killed three of the eight
Franciscans and destroyed the seven principal missions in the
province, suspending evangelism there. Assisted by loyal Apalachee, Spanish troops put down the revolt. Florida’s royal treasury officials, reporting on the rebellion, confirmed their belief
that the mission of the colony’s military contingent was to support the conversion of the natives. They added that to do so
effectively they needed thirty or forty more soldiers to establish

ed. Maynard Geiger, Franciscan Studies, 18 (July 1936), 73-96; Geiger,
Franciscan Conquest of Florida, 86-122, 150; Sweett and Sheppy, Spanish
Missions of Florida, 26-30; Keegan y Tormo Sanz, Experiencia Misionera,
275-83.
8. Oré, “Martyrs of Florida,” 112-36; Geiger, Franciscan Conquest of Florida,
218, 227, 232, 239-59; Gannon, Cross in the Sand, 49-55; Sweett and
Sheppy, Spanish Missions of Florida, 4; Charlton W. Tebeau, A History
of Florida (Coral Gables, 1971), 16-17; Governor Juan Fernández de
Olivera to Crown, October 13, 1612, Archivo General de Indias, Seville,
Spain, estante 54, cajón 5, legajo 14, número 72, photostat in Stetson
Collection, P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida,
Gainesville. Archivo General photostats and transcripts hereinafter will
be cited as AGI, followed by location and document numbers; Stetson
Collection documents will be cited as ST. Olivera to Crown, October 13,
1612, AGI 54-5-10, microfilm reel 6, Woodbury Lowery Collection of
Manuscripts, “The Spanish Settlements in the United States, MSS, Florida” (hereinafter cited as WL-Reel No.), translated summary in “A
Calendar of Spanish Documents Pertaining to Florida, 1512-1764,” William B. Griffin, comp., 1959, St. Augustine Historical Society Library
(hereinafter cited as SAHS).
9. Governor Luis de Horruytiner to King, November 15, 1633, AGI 54-5-18,
15, ST.
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a garrison in Apalachee, where it would complete the conquest
of the heathen and maintain security in the province.10
The Apalachian revolt kept alive the issue of whether or not
soldiers should be stationed in or near the Indian missions. Responding to a complaint from Fray Pedro Moreno Ponce de
León, the King accused Florida’s governors of using the pretext
of royal service to send troops to the provinces to trade and farm
for their personal profit. The soldiers, the King charged, exploited and abused the Indians, negating the magnificent efforts
of the Franciscans. His Majesty’s only interest in Florida was to
“salvage and increase the work of holy conversions.“11
The dispute became particularly heated during the regime of
Governor Diego de Rebolledo, 1654-1658. In 1656 an eight-month
Indian rebellion in Timucua and Apalachee wracked Rebolledo’s
troubled administration. The governor and the friars blamed
each other for the revolt. The Florida missions had reached their
probable greatest numerical strength the year before. As usual
in such insurrections, the missions in the area were destroyed
and Spanish soldiers had to suppress it and restore control.12
Bitterly denouncing Governor Rebolledo, the Franciscans
spelled out their objections to quartering troops among the missions. First, Rebolledo’s detachment of a lieutenant and twelve
soldiers could not protect any area. The soldiers’presence in the
villages engendered Indian mutiny. Weak bachelors, inclined
“that way,” aroused jealousy among Indian braves when the
whites took their women. Soldiers sometimes mistreated friars as
well as Indians, reducing the padres’influence over the natives.
As the troops required local support, they were not welcome, but
10.

Royal Officials of Florida to King, March 18, 1647, AGI 54-5-14, 105, ST;
July 28, 1647, AGI 54-5-20, 51, ST; Petition of Fray Pedro Moreno Ponce
de León, endorsed July 9, 1648, AGI 54-5-20, 54, ST; Petition of Moreno,
endorsed August 3, 1648, AGI 54-5-20, 58, ST; Royal Cédula to Governor and Royal Officials of Florida, August 8, 1648, AGI 58-1-21, 5, ST;
Royal Cédula to Royal Officials of Florida, December 5, 1651, AGI
54-5-14, 110, ST; Gannon, Cross in the Sand, 56-57; Lanning, Spanish
Missions of Georgia, 167-69; Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians,
119; Matter, “Economic Basis of the Seventeenth-Century Florida Missions,” 27-29.
11. Royal Cédula to Royal Officials of Florida, December 5, 1651, AGI
54-5-14, 110, ST.
12. Father Juan Gómez to Father Francisco Martínez, March 13, 1657, AGI
54-5-10, 73, ST; April 4, 1657, AGI 54-5-10, 74, ST; Lanning, Spanish
Missions of Georgia, 169, 204-08; Gannon, Cross in the Sand, 57-59;
Matter, “Spanish Missions of Florida,” 106, 262.
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the Indians were afraid to complain to the governor. The priests
believed a lieutenant and one soldier could perform all legitimate
duties without straining Indian resources.13
In rebuttal, Rebolledo cited repeated royal orders charging
him with the defense of Florida, whose coasts were infested with
enemy vessels. The governor pointed out that soldier abuses of
the Indians could be corrected or tempered, giving the friars a
chance to function, whereas an enemy occupation of an inadequately-defended province would prevent Spanish evangelism
there. The small force he had sent to Apalachee was to be reinforced, for he planned to establish a Spanish fort and settlement
there. According to Rebolledo, the caciques (chiefs) claimed their
people were well-treated by the soldiers, whom they welcomed.14
Though Rebolledo’s small detachment remained in Apalachee, his recommendation to reduce the number of Franciscans
in Florida was ignored; nor could he convince the Crown of the
need for greater military protection for the missions. Instead, the
Council of the Indies, charged with the administrative supervision of Spanish America, recommended to the King an increase
of thirty Franciscans in Florida. Emphasizing that the principal
obligation of the Crown was the conversion of the Indians, it declared it was proper for His Majesty to support the poor padres
who would serve like soldiers defending the frontiers.15
Despite continuing Franciscan opposition, the Crown, in the
face of reports of English overtures to Florida’s Indians, dared
not withdraw the infantry from Apalachee. Complying with new
royal orders, Rebolledo’s successors maintained a small force
there consistent with inadequate total military strength and
needs elsewhere. Like their predecessors they reasoned that the
safety of the missions depended upon effective local military de-

13. Franciscans of Florida to King, September 10, 1657, AGI 54-5-20, 72,
WL-7, trans. by E. W. Lawson, SAHS.
14. Ibid.; “Testimony of Governor Diego de Rebolledo’s Visita of Apalachee
and Timucua,” January-September 1657, AI Escribanía de Cámara, legajo
155, no. 18, ST; Rebolledo to Crown, October 18, 1657, AGI 58-1-26, 4,
ST.
15. Rebolledo to Crown, October 18, 1657, AGI 58-1-26, 4, ST; Council of
the Indies to King, March 23, 1658, AGI 53-1-6, 71, ST. Four years later
the Franciscans complained that their current governor still had not
withdrawn the soldiers from Apalachee, thus failing to comply with a
royal cédula of March 29, 1659. See Franciscans of Florida to Crown,
December 21, 1662, AGI 54-5-20, ST.
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tachments.16 Reinforcing their belief, in 1661, as always, it required a military expedition from the capital to arrest frequent
heathen-Indian raids which had forced the displacement of the
most important mission in Guale, Tolomato, to a location only
about eight miles north of St. Augustine.17 When Governor
Alonso de Aranguiz y Cotes reported that the Indians had
ravaged Guale and that foreign whites were constructing a fort
near the northern frontier, the safety of Spanish fleets in the
Bahama Channel again became an important matter for consideration in Madrid.18 Regardless, in 1664 the persistent Franciscans, echoing their previous objections, again requested the
King to order the withdrawal of the infantry from Apalachee and
“from wherever else they might be.” The Crown, however, manifested its growing awareness of Florida’s vulnerability and importance in a firm response referring to recent instructions for
the governor to fortify Apalachee.19
A surprise sacking of St. Augustine by the English “pirate,”
Robert Searles, in May 1668, reinforced Madrid’s shifting emphasis to military affairs in Florida. Among other measures
Mariana, the Queen Regent during the minority of Charles II,
1665-1675, directed the construction of a stone fortress at St.
Augustine. 20
To counteract the growing English threat, Governor Manuel
de Cendoya in 1671 stationed twenty-five soldiers at Santa Catalina, then the colony’s northernmost post. He maintained his
Apalachian garrison also at twenty-five. To alleviate his military
16. Governor Alonso de Aranguiz y Cotes to King, January 5, 1659, AGI
58-2-2, 3, ST; November 9, 1659, AGI 58-1-26, 5, ST; Ad-interim Governor Nicolás Ponce de León II to King, February 19, 1664, AGI 54-5-10,
95, ST.
17. Lanning, Spanish Missions of Georgia, 209-10.
18. Aranguiz y Cotes to King, September 8, 1662, AGI 54-5-10, 94, ST; Junta
de Guerra de Indias to Council of the Indies, October 10, 1662, AGI
58-2-2, 9, ST.
19. Franciscans of Florida to King, June 16, 1664, AGI 54-5-18, 64, ST.
20. Governor Francisco de la Guerra y de la Vega to Queen, August 8, 1668,
AGI 54-5-10, 106 1/2, ST; Junta de Guerra to Queen, January 22, 1669,
AGI 58-2-2, 11, ST, trans. by North Carolina Works Project Administration and North Carolina Historical Commission; Junta de Guerra to
Queen, March 8, 1669, AGI 58-2-2, 12, ST; Royal Cédula to Viceroy of
New Spain, March 11, 1669, AGI 2-4-1/19, 2, ST. Queen Mariana’s
regency is cited from Lucy L. Wenhold, trans. and ed., “A 17th Century
Letter of Gabriel Díaz Vara Calderón, Bishop of Cuba, Describing the
Indians and Indian Missions of Florida,” Smithsonian Miscellaneous
Collections, vol. 95, no. 16, publication 3398 (Washington, 1936), 6.
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weakness Cendoya would try to form a company of cavalry and
one of militia, but he pointed out the lack of colonists for such
21
an enterprise. Preoccupied with critical military problems, Governor Cendoya still hoped to further the evangelical effort, but
under a protective military umbrella. In December 1672, the governor stated he needed 100 infantry to fortify and defend adequately the fertile province of Apalachee. Only nineteen soldiers
were stationed there at the time; thirteen were in Guale.22 By
May 1675, the strength of the Guale garrison had fallen to nine.23
While Florida’s military posture was deteriorating, its evangelical program, favored by the Crown, overcoming great obstacles, expanded considerably. In 1655 it claimed an unlikely
26,000 Indian converts in about forty principal missions, served
by possibly seventy friars. By 1675, the mission system had reached
24
its greatest extent and influence. As seen, during such relatively
prosperous times the missions, when tested, were ineffective instruments of frontier defense. In the late 1660s, the Crown, reversing its policy, began to favor the governors in the church-state
dispute over colonial security. Partly as a result, the friars eventually lost much of their zeal, and the missions began to decay.25
During the decline in strength and vitality of the mission system
after 1675, it failed to meet even greater challenges to its defense
role than it previously unsuccessfully had faced.
21. Governor Manuel de Cendoya to Queen, October 31, 1671, AGI 58-1-26,
13 A-B, ST; November 6, 1671, AGI 58-1-26, 14, ST.
22. Cendoya to Queen, November 6, 1671, AGI 58-1-26, 14, ST; February 3,
1672, AGI 58-1-35, 8, ST; December 15, 1672, AGI 58-1-26, 21, ST; December 20, 1672, AGI 54-2-3, 7, ST.
23. Governor Pablo de Hita Salazar to Queen, June 15, 1675, AGI 32-4-29/35,
2, ST.
24. Gannon, Cross in the Sand, 57, 64-67; Lanning, Spanish Missions of
Georgia, 166-69, 213; Matter, “Spanish Missions of Florida,” 88-89, 102-03,
106, 111-17, 339-40n, 340-4ln, 345n, 349; Matter, “Economic Basis of the
Seventeenth-Century Florida Missions,” 18-19; Mark F. Boyd, “Spanish
Mission Sites in Florida,” Florida Historical Quarterly, XVII (April 1939),
255-80; Maynard Geiger, “Biographical Dictionary of the Franciscans in
Spanish Florida and Cuba (1528-1841),” Franciscan Studies, XXI (1940),
1-9, 119-31.
25. Visitador Father Juan Machado to King, August 8, 1688, AGI 54-5-12,
69, ST; Fray Manuel Mendoza to Governor of Florida, September 10,
1687, enclosure to Governor Diego de Quiroga y Losada to the Crown,
May 20, 1691, AGI 54-5-13/21, ST, translated summary in “Religious
Index of Persons, Places, and Things,” Catholic Historical Survey of
Florida, St. Augustine Foundation, 1963-1965 (hereinafter cited as RI),
P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida; Quiroga
y Losada to Crown, August 31, 1690, AGI 54-5-13, 13-132, microfilm
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In 1674 and 1675, at the zenith of its mission era, Florida enjoyed the second episcopal visitation of its long-neglected existence. During his ten strenuous months in the colony Don
Gabriel Díaz Vara Calderón, bishop of Santiago de Cuba, visited
all thirty-six principal missions and confirmed 13,152 Christian
Indians. Travelling more than forty leagues north from St.
Augustine to Santa Catalina and over 100 leagues west as far as
the Chattahoochee River in Apalachicola, Calderón reported two
to twenty leagues separated the missions. Protecting this impressive religious empire, the bishop described, in addition to the
castillo at the capital, an infantry garrison with cannon at the
large Apalachian mission of San Luis de Talimali (on the western edge of current Tallahassee) and “an officer with a good
garrison of infantry at Santa Catalina.” During this period of
prime religious activity Calderón found it prudent to maintain
at his own expense a company of Spanish infantry from St.
Augustine and two companies of Indian arquebusiers and archers
to escort him safely through the frontier areas flanked by the
“barbarous and warlike heathen” Chiscas and Chichimecos.26
Assuming a five-year gubernatorial term in 1675, Pablo de
Hita Salazar also experienced an Indian uprising which demonstrated again the impracticality of the Franciscan agitation to remove Spanish soldiers from the Florida frontiers. This time, in
mid-1675, the Chacatos in Apalachicola revolted. They were new
converts who had been helped into the fold by Bishop Calderón.
When a small military relief column proved to be inadequate,
the two resident priests retired with the soldiers to fortified San
Luis de Talimali. By October a stronger Spanish force had restored order in Apalachicola. 27 The governor urged the Crown to
reel 8, Spanish Records of North Carolina Historical Commission (hereinafter cited as NC-Reel No.), P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History;
Quiroga y Losada to King, November 28, 1692, AGI 54-5-13, 148, ST, RI;
Gannon, Cross in the Sand, 69-74; Lanning, Spanish Missions of Georgia,
199-200; Matter, “Spanish Missions of Florida,” 116-22, 189-91, 309-17;
Mark F. Boyd, Hale G. Smith, and John W. Griffin, Here They Once
Stood: The Tragic End of the Apalachee Missions (Gainesville, 1951), x,
6, 8; Geiger, “Biographical Dictionary of the Franciscans,” 9, 127-40.
26. Wenhold, “17th Century Letter,” 2-12; Bishop of Cuba to Queen, November 20, 1675, ACI 54-3-2, 1, ST. A “Calderón league” equals approximately 2.6 English miles. Boyd, “Spanish Mission Sites,” 275. Griffin,
in Here They Once Stood, 139, gives the 1675 population of San Luis as
1,400. Matter, “Spanish Missions of Florida,” 349n, 353n; Verner W.
Crane, The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732 (Ann Arbor, 1929), 9.
27. De Hita Salazar to Queen, August 9, 1675, AI Escribanía de Cámara,
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send 100 more soldiers and 100 families previously requested—
the minimum needed to secure the colony. The royal response
the next year authorized de Hita Salazar to build the most economical fort to protect the port of Apalachee and to report his
needs. 28
In a 1676 petition requesting new missionaries, Fray Alonso
del Moral referred to a royal cédula which cited the “poor religious that go not only to convert Indians so ferocious as those
of Florida, but also to defend like soldiers those frontiers.“29 The
story of the Chacato revolt and accounts of earlier and later Indian uprisings, reveal some exaggeration in such a contention.
The ejection of the friars from Apalachicola in 1675 and their
inability to re-establish themselves there later, despite military
support which they had requested, perhaps caused the Franciscans to reflect on their claim of defending the frontiers.30 At
any rate, the Florida church-state controversy over military security subsided near the end of the seventeenth century, while
those concerned with jurisdiction and treatment of the Indians
continued unabated, or even increased.
Interwoven with the dispute about the deployment of the
colony’s military contingent was a running feud over the ratio of
friars to soldiers in the dotación, as Florida’s manpower allotment was called. A corollary to this argument was the debate
over the portion of the situado, or supporting royal subsidy
from New Spain, which should go to the missions. The governors,
invariably military men, charged with the security of Florida,
frequently disagreed with the churchmen and the Crown on the
matter. Although most governors encouraged and supported a
vigorous religious campaign, they deplored the inclusion of the
Franciscans in their manning table. Almost with one voice they
urged the Crown to establish a separate religious personnel pollegajo 156, ZZ Coyer, page folios 119-42, ST. Calderón claimed that
those Indians had eagerly awaited conversion for many years. Wenhold,
“17th Century Letter,” 9.
28. De Hita Salazar to Queen, August 24, 1675, AGI 32-4-29/35, 5, ST; Royal
Cédula to de Hita Salazar, June 20, 1676, AGI 34-4-29/35, ST.
29. Royal Cédula to Casa de Contratación, March 29, 1658, enclosure to
Petition of Fray Alonso del Moral, endorsed September 24, 1676, AGI
54-5-20, 103, ST.
30. Governor Juan Márquez Cabrera to King, December 8, 1680, AGI 54-5-11,
Woodbury Lowery Manuscripts, “. . . MSS, Florida,” vol. IX, Library of
Congress; Royal Cédula to Cabrera, November 10, 1682, AGI 58-1-21,
352, NC-5, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History.
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icy and to support the missionaries from sources other than
Florida’s subsidy, which invariably arrived late and short of the
prescribed amount. In their view, the greater the number of friars
in the dotación, the fewer the number of soldiers, and thus the
weaker the defenses. This local secular concern for the military
strength of the colony rebutted the premise of the Spanish government, the Franciscans, and modern scholars that the mission
system, as an agent of the Church and the state, teamed with the
presidio to hold conquered districts and defend endangered
frontiers. The royal concept of the missions as instruments of
defense in the Indies was illustrated by the practice of charging their expenses, as well as those of the presidios, to the war
ministry. 31
By 1595, after Florida appeared secure, the Crown gradually
had reduced the authorized personnel strength to a stabilized
figure of 300. Although soldiers comprised the bulk of the garrison, the dotación usually also included, from 1615, forty-three
Franciscans. At times widows, retired soldiers, and other militarily ineffectives also made up a part of the garrison’s roster. The
missionaries, who comprised the biggest block of non-military
personnel, were considered to be occupying soldier spaces in the
manning table and were supposed to receive soldier pay and support from the elusive situado. As the amount of the subsidy depended upon the size of the garrison, supposedly limited by the
300-man dotación, including the friars, military strength and support theoretically varied inversely as that of the padres.32
31. Matter, “Economic Basis of the Seventeenth-Century Florida Missions,”
20, 22-24, 26, 31, 33-38; Chatelain, Defenses of Spanish Florida, 24-25, 30,
35, 61, 118n, 119-20n; Sweett and Sheppy, Spanish Missions of Florida,
24; Geiger, Franciscan Conquest of Florida, 67, 248-49; Bolton, Wider
Horizons, 80-84, 109, 115, 124-25, 147. In a seeming exception to, or contradiction of, the premise that mission expenses were charged to the
military budget, the King in 1651 wrote, perhaps rhetorically, that he
maintained the presidio and soldiers in Florida to employ churchmen
and augment the faith there, thereby including defense costs in an
evangelical budget. Royal Cédula to Royal Officials of Florida, December
5, 1651, AGI 54-5-14, 110, ST; Matter, “Economic Basis of the Seventeenth-century Florida Missions,” 35-36.
32. Governor Juan de Salinas to King, November 20, 1618, AGI 54-5-10, 7,
ST; Governor Luis de Rojas y Borja to Crown, February 11, 1624, AGI
53-2-11, ST: Horruytiner to King, November 15, 1633, AGI 54-5-10, 35,
ST; Petition of Fray Juan Moreno, endorsed April 22, 1673, AGI 54-5-20,
99, ST; de Hita Salazar to Queen, June 15, 1675, AGI 32-4-29/35, 2, ST;
Matter, “Economic Basis of the Seventeenth-Century Florida Missions,”
35-38; Chatelain, Defenses of Spanish Florida, 24-25, 133n; Matter, “Span-
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A rare display of Franciscan agreement with gubernatorial defense requirements occurred in late 1606, when Philip III ordered
Governor Pedro de Ibarra to eliminate the presidio at St. Augustine and reduce the number of Florida’s soldiers to 150. The
friars, fearing that pagan Indians would wipe out the missions if
Spanish military strength were diminished so drastically, unconditionally backed the governor’s protest, and the King withdrew the order.33 However, until late in the seventeenth century,
the usual Franciscan attitude toward the military, and the
churchmen’s concept of the broad scope of their work, were more
aptly expressed by Father Francisco Pareja to Visitor General
Fray Luís Gerónimo de Oré in 1614: “It seems to them [government officials] that the soldiers are the necessary ones . . . and that
we are of no use, but we are the ones who bear the burden and
heats, and who are the ones who are subduing and conquering
the land.“34
The issue of military-religious strength priorities remained
prominent during the next forty years of Crown-supported mission expansion, coupled with neglect of the military. For example, Governor Juan de Treviño Guillamas (1613-1618) complained about the excessive number of missionaries alloted to
Florida and the resulting paucity of soldiers. He thought eight or
ten religious, rather than the forty-three then assigned, would
suffice, and he advocated reducing their number to augment his
military strength.35 Further, in 1621 Governor Juan de Salinas
reported the actual strength of the Florida garrison as 250, including thirty-five Franciscans. He recommended it be increased
to the authorized strength of 300, excluding the religious.36
Meanwhile, the Franciscans asked the Crown for an increase of

33.
34.

35.
36.

ish Missions of Florida,” 417-22; Lanning, Spanish Missions of Georgia,
210-13; Geiger, Franciscan Conquest of Florida, 5-6; Sweett and Sheppy,
Spanish Missions of Florida, 22, 24; TePaske, Governorship of Spanish
Florida, 6.
Geiger, Franciscan Conquest of Florida, 208-12; Sweett and Sheppy,
Spanish Missions of Florida, 39.
Oré, “Martyrs of Florida,” 107. The Franciscans felt “with some justification that their work and their success in controlling the Indians made
them . . . indispensable. . . .” At times they considered themselves a
superior instrument of frontier defense than the military. During the first
century of colonial Florida’s existence, the Crown appeared to back the
missionaries’ contention. See Chatelain, Defenses of Spanish Florida,
24-25.
Geiger, Franciscan Conquest of Florida, 246-49.
Salinas to King, May 15, 1621, AGI 54-5-10, 11, ST.
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thirty missionaries to a total of sixty-five to serve the growing
number of Indian converts.37
Again, reporting on the Apalachian rebellion of 1647, Florida’s royal officials claimed there would be enough soldiers in the
colony if the forty-three priests assigned were not included in the
300-man dotación.38 Reacting to the revolt and influenced by the
religious, the Crown in July 1648, raised the number of authorized Franciscans in Florida to seventy. However, in keeping with
a 1646 royal decree the number of friars would not detract from
a 300-man military dotación .39 Nevertheless, subsequent reports
continued to show forty-three Franciscans occupying spaces in
the manning table.
Despite a flood of royal orders to strengthen Florida’s defenses
during the period 1668-1671, Governor Cendoya frequently complained of a shortage of infantry and reiterated the favorite
reason of the governors for Florida’s military weakness: “The
300 infantry spaces for the presidio included forty-three missionaries” and various other ineffective types. Cendoya requested that
a reported 300-man dotación be confirmed and filled with effective military personnel, specifically excluding the Franciscans.40
English depredations and Governor Cendoya’s estimate of less
than eighty effective soldiers among the 280 names on his roster
as late as March 1672 provided the inspiration for his many requests for military reinforcements.41 A responding 1673 royal
cédula ordered the Viceroy of New Spain to increase Florida’s
annual subsidy to support a total of 393 men, including the
religious. 42
While the Florida missions were attaining their zenith, the
concurrent short-sighted military policies led Spain to lose the
first round in the struggle with England for the area now comprising the southeastern United States. Spain managed to do this
without striking an effective blow. In 1670, reacting quickly to
37. Franciscans of Florida to King, September 1, 1621, AGI 53-2-11, ST.
38. Royal Officials of Florida to King, March 18, 1647, AGI 54-5-14, 105, ST.
39. Royal Cédula to Governor and Royal Officials of Florida, July 26, 1648,
AGI 58-1-21,4, ST.
40. Cendoya to Queen, October 31, 1671, AGI 58-1-26, 13 A-B, ST.
41. Ibid., March 3, 1671, AGI 58-2-3, 3, ST; March 24, 1672, AGI 58-1-25,
16 A-Abis.B., ST; December 20, 1672, AGI 54-2-3, 7 and 8, ST.
42. Royal Cédula to Viceroy of New Spain, February 28, 1673, AGI 58-1-21,
81, ST; Royal Cédula to Cendoya, February 28, 1673, AGI 58-1-21, 76,
ST.
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the founding of English Fort St. George just north of Santa
Elena, Governor Francisco de la Guerra y de la Vega sent a small
naval expedition against the intruders. A sudden storm dispersed
his fleet, aborting the attack. Spanish failure to reinforce Florida
prevented the governor from trying again, thus losing perhaps the
best chance to stop the English advance.43
In 1680 England’s first major attack on Spanish Florida
failed to take the mission of Santiago de Ocone on Jekyl Island
in Guale, about thirty leagues north of St. Augustine.44 But it
soon resumed the offensive, this time successfully. A spirited defense by Captain Francisco de Fuentes, commanding five Spanish
soldiers and forty Christian Indians, could not save Santa Catalina from a well-armed, English-led force of 300.45 The Spaniards
retreated southward, partly because of Indian desertions to the
English who lured them with clothing and firearms.46 English
raids, aided by former Spanish-mission Indians, practically finished the missions north of the St. Marys River in 1683. Offering
amazingly-little resistance, by 1686 Spain had lost all of Guale in
an impotent six-year campaign.47
Rising England did not stop its advance in Florida on declining Spain with the conquest of Guale. English-Indian attacks
on mission towns in Timucua and Apalachee, beginning in earnest in 1685, resulted in the loss of those provinces too. Carolinian
traders spearheaded the English penetration into the lightly-held
interior.48 During the period 1689-1691 a small Spanish block43. Cendoya to Queen, October 31, 1671, AGI 58-1-26, 13, ST; Chatelain,
Defenses of Spanish Florida, 65; Crane, Southern Frontier, 1670-1732, 10.
44. Lanning, Spanish Missions of Georgia, 216.
45. Captain Francisco de Fuentes to Governor Cabrera, February 7, 1681,
ACI 54-5-11, WL-9, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History; Lanning,
Spanish Missions of Georgia, 216; ChateIain, Defenses of Spanish Florida,
78. Fuentes had equipped sixteen Indians with firearms, and Salazar
backed him in that rare Spanish act of issuing guns to Indian warriors.
See also Boyd, Smith, and Griffiin, Here They Once Stood, 19.
46. Crane, Southern Frontier, 1670-1732, 24-26; Lanning, Spanish Missions of
Georgia, 216-20. An attempt by Cabrera to relocate Christian Gualeans to
safer areas to the south also caused Indian desertions. Gannon, Cross in
the Sand, 71-73.
47. Chatelain, Defenses of Spanish Florida, 78; Crane, Southern Frontier,
1670-1732, 25-31.
48. Lanning, Spanish Missions of Georgia, 177-84, 220-23; Crane, Southern
Frontier, 1670-1732, 6, 7, 34-36; Boyd, Smith, and Griffin, Here They
Once Stood, 8-9, 11. Despite the loyalty and assistance rendered the
Spaniards by some Christian Indians, the impact of the Carolinian
traders on the frontier natives and the desertion of many Indians to
the English invaders lend little support from colonial Florida to the
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house in Apalachicola failed to regain a foothold in that western
province. Most of the Lower Creek Indians there migrated eastward, closer to the English settlements in Carolina. From their
new homeland the Creeks raided Spanish missions in Timucua
and Apalachee, enriching Carolinian slave traders.49 But in April
1696, Governor Laureano de Torres y Ayala reported that the
often-discussed fort at San Marcos de Apalachee was practically
completed.50 It proved to be poorly located to meet Carolinian attacks that came overland from the north and east rather than
from the sea to the south.
Another Spanish effort at this time to strengthen their weakening hold on Florida ended in failure. Making the only major
Franciscan attempt to convert South Florida, early in 1696 twenty
friars from Spain, reportedly at the request of the natives, tried,
without military support, to extend their mission field into the
peninsula. An Indian revolt in October forced their withdrawal.
Another abortive attempt in Calusa by six missionaries the following year ended Franciscan designs on South Florida.51
In 1701 the War of the Spanish Succession broke an uneasy
peace between England and Spain. In America the conflict,
known as Queen Anne’s War, practically eliminated Spain’s
missions in Florida and reduced her rarely secure grip on the
colony to St. Augustine and vicinity. That Spain was able to retain the capital, of course, was due in part to the Castillo de San
Marcos and its outlying auxiliary defense lines, which by then

thesis that “missionaries counteracted foreign influence among their
neophytes, deterred them from molesting the interior settlements, and
secured their aid in holding back more distant tribes.” Bolton, Wider
Horizons, 125. See Chatelaine, Defenses of Spanish Florida, 24-25, 30, 58.
Rather, it was the apparent military, economic, and demographic weakness of Spanish Florida’s outlying regions that invited English-Indian
attacks on the missions.
49. Crane, Southern Frontier, 1670-1732, 35-37; Boyd, Smith, and Griffin,
Here They Once Stood, 8-9; Lanning, Spanish Missions of Georgia,
182-84.
50. Governor Laureano de Torres y Ayala to King, April 15, 1696, in
Boyd, Smith, and Griffin, Here They Once Stood, 21. All subsequent
documents cited from this source were translated by Boyd.
51. Crown to Franciscan Provincial and Definitorio of Florida, January 24,
1696, AGI 58-1-22, 355, ST, RI; Torres y Ayala to Crown, February 3,
1697, AGI 54-5-13, 101, ST, RI; Don Martín de Sierralta to Fray Francisco Herrero, June 5, 1698, AGI 58-1-22, 463, ST, RI; Torres y Ayala to
Crown, September 19, 1699, AGI 54-5-13, 154, ST, RI.
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had become one of the most formidable Spanish military installations in the Indies.52
Queen Anne’s War began in Florida in May 1702, when a
band of Apalachicolan Indians, reputedly led by an Englishman,
burned the important Timucuan town of Santa Fé Governor
José de Zúñiga y Cerda’s punitive expedition of 800 Indian and
Spanish soldiers was ambushed and decisively defeated by an
English-led Creek army. As usual throughout the conflict, the
bows and arrows of the Spanish Indians proved to be no match
for the enemy-Indian firearms.53
In the fall of 1702 Governor James Moore of South Carolina
failed to take St. Augustine’s castillo, and his siege of nearly two
months was broken by a Spanish relief armada from Cuba. However, during the campaign Moore’s land column wiped out the
few remaining missions north of the St. Johns River, leveled St.
Augustine, and ravaged the countryside.54
Colonel Moore, replaced as governor by Sir Nathaniel Johnson, in January 1704, with fifty whites and 1,000 Indians, captured Nuestra Señora de la Purísima Concepción de Ayubale, one
of the largest mission towns in Apalachee, after a stout defense
by Indian converts under Fray Angel de Miranda. The next day
Moore’s army routed a rescue column of about thirty Spanish
soldiers and 400 Apalachee Indians from San Luis de Talimali.
The English commander then by-passed fortified San Luis but
marched on other Apalachian towns. 55 A few months later Moore
informed his governor that “Apalatchee [sic] is now reduced.“56
In a second report Moore boasted: “I . . . have killed, and taken
as slaves 325 men, and have taken slaves 4,000 women and children. . . . All . . . with the loss of 4 whites and 15 Indians.“57
Crane, Southern Frontier, 1670-1732, 71, 81; Gannon, Cross in the Sand,
76; Chatelain, Defenses of Spanish Florida, 59, 75, 79, 82-84; Boyd, Smith,
and Griffin, Here They Once Stood, 10, 16, 19.
53. Governor José de Zúñiga y Cerda to King, September 30, 1702, in
Boyd, Smith, and Griffin, Here They Once Stood, 36-38; Crane, Southern
Frontier, 1670-1732, 74; Lanning, Spanish Missions of Georgia, 184-85.
54. Mark F. Boyd, trans., “The Siege of St. Augustine in 1702,” Florida
Historical Quarterly, XXVI (April 1948), 346-52; Crane, Southern
Frontier, 1670-1732, 76-77; Lanning, Spanish Missions of Georgia, 227-28.
55. Zúñiga y Cerda to King (extract), March 30, 1704; Colonel James Moore
to Governor Sir Nathaniel Johnson, April 16, 1704 [?]; Moore to Lords
Proprietors (extract), April 16, 1704, in Boyd, Smith, and Griffin, Here
They Once Stood, 49, 91-95.
56. Moore to Johnson, April 16, 1704 [?], ibid., 93.
57. Moore to Lords Proprietors, April 16, 1704, ibid., 94-95.
52.
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Fearing to leave St. Augustine defenseless, Governor Zúñiga
did not send a relief column to Apalachee. His account of the
battles and those of Spanish eyewitnesses contained incidents
not reported by Moore: Many Spaniards and Christian Indians
were tortured, mutilated, and burned at the stake. The raiders
slashed the bodies of some captives and stuck burning splinters
in the wounds. Spaniards charged that Catholic captives were
skinned alive. Moore’s alleged response to charges of inhumanity
was that, as he had only eighty Englishmen and 1,500 Indians in
his army, he could not prevent the atrocities.58 Many of the remaining Christian Indians in Apalachee declared they were tired
of waiting for Spanish aid that never came; they did not want to
remain with the Spaniards and die. Further wholesale SpanishIndian desertions followed.59
In repeated raids in Apalachee in the years 1701-1704 the
estimated number of Spanish Indians killed exceeded 3,000. By
the end of that period the Apalachian population allegedly had
shrunk from some 8,000 in fourteen villages to approximately 200
scattered in four locations. Governor Zúñiga ordered remaining
Spaniards evacuated to St. Augustine. Indians who desired to
leave would be welcome in the east. Only the village of Ivitachuco
chose to seek Spanish protection.60 Apalachee, the province of the
Franciscans’ greatest success in Florida, temporarily became a
wilderness. Reportedly, within a year from the evacuation of the
region, there were no traces of people, cattle, trails, or villages in
that once-flourishing mission field.61
The province of Timucua, harrassed by the English since
1685, also suffered the fate of Guale and Apalachee. EnglishIndian allies devastated the remaining Timucuan missions in
1706. An unknown Carolinian wrote in 1710: “there remains not
now, so much as one Village with ten Houses in it, in all Florida,
that is subject to the Spaniards; nor have they any Houses or
Cattle left, but such as they can protect by the Guns of their
Castle of St. Augustine, that alone being now in their Hands,
58. Zúñiga y Cerda to King, February 3, 1704; March 30, 1704 (extract);
Manuel Solana, Deputy of Apalachee, to Zúñiga, July 8, 1704; Extracts
from the auto of an inquiry into the details of the Fathers in Apalachee,
June 1705, ibid., 48-54, 74-82.
59. Solana to Zúñiga y Cerda, July 8, 1704, ibid., 54.
60. “[Record of] Council of War, San Agustín, July 13, 1704,” ibid., 56-58.
61. Admiral Landeche to Viceroy, August 11, 1705, ibid., 82-84.
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and which is continually infested by the perpetual Incursions of
the Indians, subject to this Province.“62
Florida Governor Francisco de Córcoles y Martínez, successor
to Zúñiga, in 1706 or 1707 organized a company of cavalry to
protect Spanish work details outside St. Augustine and the 300
Christian Indians camped nearby from English-led raids. Córcoles
estimated from 10,000 to 20,000 Indians had been carried into
63
slavery by the English by 1708. The ruthless Carolinian neighbors and their Indian allies had dealt a mortal blow to the
Spanish missions of Florida, indeed to the entire colony. Even
the skeleton of their once-impressive mission chain— a few tiny
Indian settlements in the shadow of San Marcos at St. Augustine
— would be ravaged and vanish before little more than fifty years
would pass.64
Spanish inability to match English trade goods nullified most
of the former’s attempts to gain new Indian allies. Despite Indian
requests for aid and protection against the English, the Spaniards
could not deliver promised firearms and food, and thus they lost
their opportunities for alliances which could have helped to restore Spanish Florida. Also, at a time when the distraught colony
needed soldiers more than missionaries, the Crown continued
abortive efforts to strengthen Florida by trying to rebuild the
frontier mission system with insufficient military protection.65
In 1762 Spain sided with France and Austria against England
and Prussia in the Seven Years’War which had erupted in 1756.
A heavily-reinforced bastion at St. Augustine, and a seemingly
firm new alliance with former Indian antagonists, had brought
Spanish Florida to a new pinnacle of military power. Ironically,
at this time Spain handed the colony to England without a contest. The English had captured Havana in 1762, and Charles III
62. Crane, Southern Frontier, 1670-1732, 81.
63. Governor Francisco de Córcoles y Martínez to King, January 14, 1708,
in Boyd, Smith, and Griffin, Here They Once Stood, 90. See also Gannon, Cross in the Sand, 76.
64. Geiger, “Biographical Dictionary of the Franciscans,” 9; Gannon, Cross in
the Sand, 76-83.
65. TePaske, Governorship of Spanish Florida, 198-226; Gannon, Cross in
the Sand, 81-82; Lanning, Spanish Missions of Georgia, 198-200, 231-34;
Mark F. Boyd, “Diego Peña’s Expedition to Apalachee and Apalachicolo
in 1716,” Florida Historical Quarterly, XXVIII (July 1949), 1-27; “Documents Describing the Second and Third Expedition of Lieutenant Diego
Peña to Apalachee and Apalachicolo in 1717 and 1718,” Florida Historical Quarterly, XXXI (October 1952), 109-39.
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by the Treaty of Paris in 1763 ceded Florida to England in exchange for the Cuban port.66
After strategic Florida seemed secure from foreign encroachment, conversion of the Indians overshadowed hard military realities. Although the missions helped to stabilize areas in which
they were located, and seemed to be a relatively easy and inexpensive way to extend and maintain Spanish influence and
authority over the frontier, they failed every major challenge to
their rule. They neither prevented nor quelled numerous Indian
rebellions nor attacks by neighboring pagans. Spanish soldiers,
sometimes, aided by allied Indians, had to put down revolts and
restore order to enable the friars to resume mission operations
disrupted by the conflicts. The Indian uprisings reinforced the
governors’ contention that colonial security and sustained progress of the evangelical program depended upon sufficient military
power. Above all, the mission system proved to be of no help in
meeting the supreme test of the English conquest of the three
main provinces of Florida.
The Spanish fantasy of considering the missionaries to be
serving as soldiers defending the frontiers, in the face of contrary
evidence, led to the ineffective substitution of Franciscan missions
for properly-manned-and-located military garrisons. Spain’s seeming reliance on the missions to control and defend the frontiers
of Florida surely helped to divert it from establishing realistic
defenses in the strategic colony.
Even when the Crown tardily realized the seriousness of the
English designs and began to temper religious priorities with
military considerations, it concentrated on that never-conquered,
but immobile stone bastion, the Castillo de San Marcos at St.
Augustine, neglecting and fatally weakening the frontier provinces. The castillo, of course, protected nothing but its own garrison and the townspeople sheltered within its walls. For example, it did not prevent the sack of St. Augustine by Moore in
1702, nor did it prevent the English conquest of far-away Guale
and Apalachee and nearby Timucua. Even the concept of its own
impregnability did not stand up. Moore’s siege of the bastion, for
instance, was lifted by the timely arrival of a relief expedition
66. Matter, “Spanish Missions of Florida,” 305-07; TePaske, Governorship
of Spanish Florida, 154-57, 223-35; Gannon, Cross in the Sand, 82-83;
Sweett and Sheppy, Spanish Missions of Florida, 47.
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from Cuba, averting the starvation of the defending, or entrapped, garrison. However, the fortress did enable the Spaniards
to retain a toehold in Florida by providing them a strong refuge
until help arrived.
Despite Franciscan protests, an adequate defense of Florida
depended upon strong, properly-deployed-and-supported mobile
Spanish military contingents and armed, trained Indian allies. If
Spain was unable or unwilling to provide such forces to relatively-unimportant Florida on the edge of its empire, it should
have carried out at least one of the numerous plans for colonizing the region if it desired to hold it. Settlement of the colony
could have provided a significant, largely self-sufficient militia to
reinforce their small nuclei of professional soldiers and Indian
allies— the military policy successfully employed by their victorious English opponents. The Spanish failure to settle and develop
Florida was the major contribution to their inability to contain
or defeat the English aggression.
Effective Franciscan opposition to adequate military security
and to the settlement of Florida significantly fostered the colony’s
fatal military and economic weakness.67 Preoccupied with their
evangelical work, the friars shortsightedly obstructed the development of a strong colony. The Franciscan position, echoed by a
vacillating Crown, led to the downfall of their own mission sys67. Though some of the early Franciscans, and at least one late in the
seventeenth century, evidenced interest in Spanish colonists settling
Florida, the opposition of many friars to the establishment of Spanish
agricultural enterprises in the colony counters Bolton’s contention that
missions and presidios were “nuclei around which ranchers settled.”
Neither did effective Franciscan opposition to an adequate military
posture in Florida firmly support Bolton’s premise that “to afford protection for missionaries and mission Indians, as well as to hold the
frontier against savages and foreigners, presidios, or garrisons, were
established near by [the missions]” or that generally the friars demanded
military aid and objected only to “unsuitable soldiers.” Nor did the
Florida story confirm the thesis that missions “served also as a means of
defense of the king’s domains” or that they “designedly or incidentally”
promoted frontier occupation. See Bolton, Wider Horizons, 82-83, 119,
124, 130-31, 147. See also Geiger, Franciscan Conquest of Florida, 146, 15153, 244-46; Lanning, Spanish Missions of Georgia, 174-75, 219; Franciscans
of Florida to King, September 10, 1657, AGI 54-5-20, 72, WL-7, trans. by
Lawson, SAHS; June 16, 1664, AGI 54-5-18, 64, ST; Royal Cédula to
Royal Officials of Florida, December 5, 1651, AGI 54-5-14, 110, ST;
“Residencia by Governor Rebolledo of Governor Ruíz de Salazar Vallecilla, and other officials,” 1656, AI Escribanía de Cámara, legajo 155,
no. 11 (new legajo division 155B), ST; Governor Rebolledo to King,
October 18, 1657, AGI 54-5-18, 52, ST; October 18, 1657, AGI 58-1-26, 4.
ST.
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tem and the loss of Florida. Unable to prevent or defeat periodic
Indian uprisings, and helpless against savage English-Indian incursions, the Florida missions failed to support the thesis that
missions were an effective instrument of frontier defense.68 Did
unprotected, militarily-challenged mission systems elsewhere fare
any better?
68.

Bolton, Wider Horizons, 80-84, 109-10, 115-19, 123-28, 130-31, 147.
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